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2ENTREPRENEURS AS SOCIAL ACTORS
 PRIVATIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CHINA AND VIETNAM
Thomas Heberer
Institute of East Asian Studies
Gerhard-Mercator University, Duisburg/Germany
Analyses of the transformation process in Eastern Europe refer sometimes to a "magic triangle",
meaning the development of a market, of "autonomy" (private ownership) and "restructuring". The
last term refers to economic adaptation to the market and the formation of an ntrepreneurship.1 A
similar magic triangle is also the initial stage in the process of social change in China and Vietnam,
which has significant consequences for social structures (changes in values, institutions and elites).
Taking the new private entrepreneurship as an example, restructuring and its political and social
consequences are investigated. Unlike in Eastern Europe, restructuring in China and Vietnam is not a
top-down process, but mainly a spontaneous, bottom-up one.
Figure 1: The Magic Triangle of Change
Change of Institutions Change of ValuesNew Elites
Entrepreneurs  Private Economy
Market
1 Entrepreneurs as Social Actors
Until quite recently, there was no question of entrepreneurship in China and Vietnam. Only since the
revival of private economic activities and their subsequent momentum have new entrepreneurs begun
to emerge. The role of entrepreneurs in the process of political and social change has up till now
largely been neglected in academic literature.2 N ithe  in economic, sociological or political science
theories have entrepreneurs been seen to play a significant role. This may be due to the influence of
the classic economists (A. Smith, Ricardo), of neo-classics, or of Marxism, in which either individual
                                                
1 Dietz 1993: 170-172.
2 Comp. Oesterdiekhoff 1993: 66-70.
3actions, for example by entrepreneurs, are held to be of little relevance, or entrepreneurs as a social
group are regarded as a negative factor.3 Central functions were attributed to overall mechanisms
like the market, investment or profit maximization, rather than to individuals or groups of individuals.
The structuring and organising factor is then completely neglected here.
To begin with I will define just what should be classified under the term entrepreneur and which
specific characteristics new entrepreneurs in both countries display.
In economic terms, the ideal-type entrepreneur is regarded as an active homo economicus who as
an owner plans an enterprise, successfully founds it and/or independently and responsibly leads it
with initiative, whereby [he] takes personal risks or capital risks.4 Purely through the semantics of the
word itself he is an "acting object",5 whereby entrepreneurial activity sets a dynamic economic
process in motion. Joseph A. Schumpeter, one of the most important entrepreneurship theorists,
attributes creative, innovative behaviour and leadership qualities to entrepreneurs. Their function is to
recognise and exploit new possibilities in the area of the economy. He also points out that the
entrepreneur acts more by ambitions than by intellectual aims and frequently has to defend himself
from accusations of deviant and antisocial behaviour.6
The economic side of entrepreneurship7 however does not reveal anything about its social and
political role. If - in line with the new system theory - one assumes enterprises to be "complex
interwoven systems of events",8 whose collective activities produce processes of change, then it
becomes clear that entrepreneurs are actors who are substantially involved in forming and influencing
this system. At the same time they do not act in a vacuum, but are embedded in structures of social
relations, and therefore are not autonomous, but act within a social environment. Social relationships
are a necessary prerequisite for successful business dealings. In order to fulfil economic functions,
social and political commitment are required, particularly if founding and leading an enterprise is
regarded not as an event, but as a process.9 Becau e of this process-like nature, the entrepreneur
must act above and beyond the purely economic sphere, in order to maintain, develop and expand
the enterprise. The Marxist definition of profit orientation as the key characteristic of
entrepreneurship does not go far enough. Firstly, profit is not an end in itself, but is - according to
Georg Simmel - simultaneously a "centre of interest"10 which "develops its own norms" and thereby
takes on a controlling function. Secondly, psychic profits,11 that is non-monetary incentives such as
social recognition, are very important to entrepreneurs. In addition, in order to provide security and
risk minimisation for the entrepreneur several factors are required: a legal framework, the creation of
individual contacts with politicians, banks and authorities, and organisation in interest groups in order
to achieve advantageous situations in economic, legal and political spheres vis-à-vis the state
(precisely these activities can be characterised as political). The entrepreneur therefore has interests
                                                
3 Werhahn 1990: 17-20; Pierenkemper 1979: 9-14; Berghoff 1991: 15-20.
4 Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon 1984: 1768/1769.
5 von Eynern 1969: 1206/1207.
6 Comp. Schumpeter 1928 and 1987: 149-151.
7 Comp. the economic theory of entrepreneurship: Casson 1982.
8 Rüegg-Sturm 1998: 3.
9 Birley 1996: 20.
10 Simmel 1994: 412.
11 Lavoie 1991: 39.
4which reach far beyond the economic sphere, even if they do serve to secure his economic activities.
As an interest actor he therefore also promotes economic and social change. Werner Sombart
referred to the capitalist entrepreneur (as opposed to the land-owning entrepreneur) as being
"decidedly subversive and a re-organiser", because he breaks with old conventions and gears the
current economic system to completely new aims.12 At the same time, he has a well-developed
desire for power in the form of his enterprising spirit which seeks to conquer all areas, not only in
business, but also in state spheres.13
The question arises whether Sc umpeter's ideal-type entrepreneur is also the typical entrepreneur in
China and Vietnam, especially since the 'western' entrepreneur is usually regarded as an autonomous
individual (in the terms of the philosophy of the Enlightenment).14 Here w  will refer to entrepreneurs
as those who have founded and now run private enterprises or those who have taken over state-
owned or privately-owned businesses which they now on the whole manage and develop
independently.15 This already demonstrates a great deal of innovation, as these are largely people
who have left the secure state sector and now find themselves on economically, politically and
socially risky, or even deviant ground. Kirzner and Codagnone (the latter referring to postsocialist
societies) have shown that entrepreneurial alertness, i.e. recognising and reacting to market signals,
even to weak ones, is more important than technical innovation. Chances and gaps in the market
should be quickly recognised and exploited in times of difficult and turbulent markets and poor
economic conditions.16
It follows then that the transitional phase in China and Vietnam requires particularly flexible private
entrepreneurs. It is the task of the relatively new entrepreneurship to contribute to the development
of an as yet incomplete market system. In order to do this, they must amass a great deal of
knowledge and create considerable social connections, along the lines of "one makes the market
work by working in the market".17 Competence and knowledge however are not enough. Precisely
in a situation where there is a lack of legal security, where private entrepreneurs are still subjected to
some degree of economic, social and political discrimination, and where interest groups cannot
openly act as pressure groups, the significance of informal structures such as social connections and
networks is particularly great. This is also true for the primary aim of the entrepreneur, the desire or
yearning for prosperity and the development of the enterprise, and also for another central factor in
entrepreneurship: risk. Both require not only economic but also social and political safeguards.
To outline the area of action in which enterprises have influence: entrepreneurship allows a higher
degree of autonomy, freedom to take decisions, independence and responsibility for oneself, and
also implies a leadership function. The field of activity is also integrated in a tight web of social
relationships. The entrepreneur in China and Vietnam is not organised in the usual work units
(Chinese: Danwei), but is active, despite all the bureaucratic restriction, in the marketplace. And
here he takes independent decisions, here he has a larger degree of social space. This freedom
                                                
12 Sombart 1987, vol. 1, part 2: 837
13 Sombart 1987, vol. 1, Part 1: 327/328; Schumpeter 1987: 155.
14 Comp. e. g. Schumann 1992: 13.
15 Manager of state-owned and collective-owned enterprises, i. e. the sphere of "intrapreneurship" (innovative
managers), comp. Carsud/Olm/Eddy 1986: 367/368).
16 Kirzner 1978, 1983, 1985 and 1989: 21/22; Codagnone 1995: 64.
17 Reid 1993: 242.
5creates a specific attitude to business and makes the entrepreneur per se into an actor who more or
less consciously tries to expand his room to manoeuvre, and not only in business, but also in social
and political spheres, in which he of course also has to act. Therefore he has the function of an actor
who in the first instance expands his own scope for action, but by doing this at the same time
expands society's scope for action vis-à-vis the state. If the state restricts the entrepreneur's room to
manoeuvre, the economic results of the market deteriorate and economic growth is reduced. For this
reason, the economic policy maker, the state, has little interest in introducing too great a restriction
on the entrepreneur.
A summary of the most important results of our surveys and interviews shows great similarities
between entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam:
- One of the most important factors in the decision to become an entrepreneur was the desire for
more independence and responsibility for oneself, which also indicates a desire for more
individual and social room to manoeuvre. The percentage of those who expressed this wish was
higher in more developed regions than in poorer areas. In the latter the desire for higher income
and an improvement in living conditions was more significant. Other factors like access to capital,
social connections (good relations with functionaries) and market chances also played a part in
the decision. Self-fulfilment was one of the most important aims in life mentioned (in both
countries over 70%).
- Most of the entrepreneurs had previously been employed as functionaries or as managers (in
state-owned enterprises). Particularly in South and Central Vietnam the proportion of
entrepreneurs from families of former 'class enemies' (members of the old regime, 'capitalists')
and ethnic Chinese was high.
- The enterprise concept is influenced by traditional paternalistic ideas. Over 80% wanted to see
their enterprise as 'one big family' in which the 'father' (the entrepreneur) looks after the
employees, who then work for the enterprise with unselfish devotion.
- Large majorities were in favour of implementing market economy structures and freedom of
economic development as a prerequisite for modernisation. They saw entrepreneurs as social
role models and pioneers.
- The enterprises are very closely linked with the local authorities, which however leads to high
costs (corruption, 'donations'). Without good social connections most entrepreneurs believe it
would be very difficult to run their business. However, high percentages of those asked were
critical about the way the Party and local government work. Only a quarter said they were
satisfied with the Party's work. The others said the Party was bureaucratic and not very efficient
and a hindrance to their business. In both countries over 70% agreed that it was necessary to
establish legal security and political participation for entrepreneurs. In China there was a
significantly greater percentage which spoke out in favour of entrepreneurs becoming involved in
politics. This was less in the sense of individual activity and more concerning the creation of
entrepreneur networks and interest groups. Absolute majorities were in favour of setting up non-
state entrepreneur associations, even if they then primarily had to co-operate with the Party and
6the state. Nevertheless more than a third was of the opinion that such associations should
function as interest groups vis-à-vis the state.
- Criticism of the political system was more outspoken in Vietnam than in China. Considerably
more entrepreneurs there regarded the current situation as a transitional phase on the way to a
more democratic system. Dissatisfaction with constant political fluctuations by the Party
leadership may encourage this tendency. Chinese entrepreneurs were more strongly in favour of
strong political leadership (93%) than those in Vietnam. However, they then demanded of that
leadership that it should introduce legal security and more freedom and individual rights.
- One must however take into account that there were also differences, in some cases significant
ones, between regions and between urban and rural areas. Additionally, in Vietnam the replies
varied significantly between the North and the South, due to very different socialisations, whilst
replies from China were much more homogenous.
On the whole, even this rough summary of the results of our study shows that the new
entrepreneurship is not only interested in processes of social and political change, but is actively
seeking to further this aim. Moreover, these results show the transformatorial potential of
entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam, which essentially consists of the following patterns:
- they generate a dynamic economic process and economic innovations, thus initiating processes of
social change;
- they contribute to the establishment of a market system and they reinforce market thinking;
- their actions lead to a stricter separation of state and economy;
- they are by no means merely profit-oriented. Non-monetary incentives, that is psychic profits
such as social prestige and acceptance are important as well. The realization of economic
objectives demands at the same time social and political engagement and influences political input
and output;
- their strong interest in economic security and risk minimization requires the establishment of social
connections and networks, a legal framework as well as the organization of interests in special
associations in order to create advantageous conditions for business. Thus entrepreneurs may act
as protagonists for a legal system;
- they prefer a higher degree of personal freedom, individualism, autonomy and self-responsibility;
- their actions engender a change of the social structure;
- their specific consumption behavior and life style influence the change of values and attitudes;
- they disregard old patterns and thus change not only values, but also institutions.
On the whole one can assume the following socio-political aims of private entrepreneurs in China and
Vietnam:
- Desire for political and financial security and legal protection
- Rejection of dominance by and preferential treatment of state ownership and distributional
structures
- Aversion to constant attempts by the Party and state to interfere in business.
72 Entrepreneurs in Official Discourses in China and Vietnam
The debate about entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam is comparatively new, since until recently
entrepreneurs simply did not exist. In the 1950s the terms 'capitalist' and 'bourgeois' were commonly
used, which branded them as antisocialists and therefore placed them outside society. As economic
reforms were introduced, individual small-scale businesses and eventually private enterprises began
to emerge. Previously, since the conversion of private enterprises to state-ownership in the 1950s,
enterprises had been managed by twosomes consisting of business director and Party secretary. This
fact still influences the discussion today in which the term 'entrepreneur' is often only used for
managers or directors of state-owned companies.18
Only as economic reforms were introduced at the end of the 1970s did small-scale entrepreneurs
(individual businesses) begin to emerge, followed in the second half of the 1980s by larger 'private
enterprises' (see Fig. 2). The following diagram shows the changing evaluation of entrepreneurs right
up to the reinterpretation of the term as 'traditional' (Chinese) or 'socialist' entrepreneurs.
                                                
18 For example Li Junjie 1997.
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The discussion about the rather neutral term 'entrepreneur' has only recently begun. Initially in China
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and entrepreneurs. They were described as "representatives of advanced productive forces in the
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9countryside" and in the "new socialist village", "the forerunners of the development of commodity
production", and "fighters against poverty in the countryside".19 In 1997 in an essay in Jingji Yanjiu,
the most important Chinese economics journal, the term 'entrepreneur' in Schumpertian usage was
the subject of debate for the first time. It also contained indications that an entrepreneurship was
beginning to develop again in China.20 As f r back as 1994 the entrepreneurship was described in an
essay as the national economy's "most valuable resource". This stratum of society should be
encouraged and aided and the necessary conditions, such as economic, political and legal equality,
created to stimulate their development. The essay continued that state sector should no longer
receive preferential treatment and that intellectuals should be encouraged to take up entrepreneurial
activities.21 In the same vein the Zhongguo Gongshang Bao wrote that it was an "honour" to be an
entrepreneur, running a business was a "heroic act", even if it had to admit that it was a decidedly
stony path that led to entrepreneurship on which many would fail.22
A contribution in the sociological journal Shehuixue Yanjiu found that there was indeed a stratum of
entrepreneurs in China, whereby the term 'stratum' was not meant ideologically (like a 'class') or
pejoratively (like the 'exploiting class'), but it was referred to a "living resource" which was
developing in a process of social change and as the product of the very market economy which it
serves.23 Here it becomes clear how much the economisation of politics is undermining the
ideological base: the category 'class' is losing its meaning and is giving way to the apparently neutral
term 'stratum'. Already in 1994 an economist had suggested that all managers of enterprises
regardless of the form of ownership should be referred to as "entrepreneurs".24 At the d of 1997 a
new journal entitled "Entrepreneur" (Qiyijia) was founded. In the first announcement of its release
the central organ of the Communist Party of China Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) declared it was a
journal "which might change your fate".25
Because the politico-economical delineation between Chinese and 'western capitalist' entrepreneurs
is becoming increasingly difficult, the Chinese entrepreneur is treated as a specifically Chinese
phenomenon. A book published in 1997 claimed that Chinese entrepreneurs differed from their
western counterparts through their own "special, particularly Chinese, characteristics": they were
"reformers", "heroes" and acted in the interest of social requirements and in order to improve social
prosperity in China.26 Another author described the difficulties caused by the term 'entrepreneur' in
China and proclaimed Chinese entrepreneurs to be "socialist entrepreneurs", because, he said, they
contribute to both the "material" and "spiritual civilization of socialism". Unlike western entrepreneurs
they should fulfil two criteria: they should be innovators and also possess political qualities.27
An article in the P ople's Daily also recognised an ideal-type entrepreneur very different from that
described by western economic theories. "As far as political and ideological qualities are concerned,
                                                
19 Wang/Chen 1995.
20 Xu Zhijian 1997.
21 Wei/Sun 1994.
22 Yu Shaowen 1997.
23 Mi/Gao 1997: 42-46; Wang Xiaodong 1996; Zhou Shulian 1996; Li/Li 1996; Wei/Xu 1996; Wang Qinghai 1997.
24 Comp. Huang Rutong 1994: 26/27.
25 Renmin Ribao, 27 October 1997.
26 Liu Yong 1997: 1-2
27 Yuan Baohua 1997: 5.
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(...) he should resolutely adhere to the party line, its guidelines and policies and state legal regulations.
" He should be able to hold his own in business, be hardworking, he should "fulfil his public duties in
an honest and upright way, work hard and live modestly, readily perform services to society and co-
operate with leadership groups [of the Party and the state] in the public interest". In terms of the job,
entrepreneurs were expected to have leadership, organisational and coordinational qualities, to show
market flexibility, to take part in further training measures on modern entrepreneurial and
management matters, and to be able to orient themselves on national and international markets. More
qualified entrepreneurs should be trained, the conditions and environment for entrepreneurial
activities should be improved and the state should help them. On the other hand the article insisted
that entrepreneurs should be kept more under control because of the high concentration of power in
their hands and because power automatically corrupts.28
Traditional Confucian ideas which suggest that entrepreneurs should act in the interest of state and
society - under a certain measure of control - whilst in a corporatist way integrated into existing
structures and who conform to paternalistic socialist conceptions are here combined with concepts
concerning adaptation to modern global economy structures and qualities, neglecting however the
innovation factor. The 'Chinese' as well as the 'Vietnamese' entrepreneur should be a 'patriot', i.e.
should identify himself with the political system and its values.
The socio-economic constellation in both countries produces two further entrepreneurial
characteristics: firstly a significant intermixing of functionaries and entrepreneurs i.e. cadres who have
become entrepreneurs and vice versa: This results from several factors: the form of business
ownership and the fact that appointments in those enterprises are made by higher-level administrative
bodies (state and collective-owned enterprises); an interest in increased income (income from
business is far higher than that from administration or party jobs); the opportunities which are open to
functionaries because of their good connections and integration in networks. Secondly, to overcome
legal insecurities and run their business successfully, entrepreneurs have to get involved in politics.
Involvement in politics often takes the form of joining the Communist Party, or alternatively becoming
a member of a committee or body which may function as a kind of public protection (People's
Congresses, Political Consultative Conferences, mass organisations). Functionaries or those with
close connections to functionaries are in this respect certainly in an advantageous starting position.29
Although the proportion of party members among private entrepreneurs is comparatively high (whilst
the proportion of party members in the entire population was 4.8% in 1997, it was 15.8% among
entrepreneurs according to a 1% sample taken in 199630).
Whilst the debate in China is becoming increasingly positive in its attitude towards entrepreneurs, in
the discussion in Vietnam the extreme positions are diverging more and more. Unlike in China, the
private sector is officially referred to as "the private capitalist sector" and private entrepreneurs are
called "private capitalists".31 In 1994 an essay claimed that because of the development of the private
sector and foreign investors, the "bourgeoisie" and the proportion of "capitalists" were increasing in
number. It continued that they would produce their own ideology and demand to have their say in
                                                
28 Qiu 1997.
29 Cheng/Sun 1996.
30 Zhang/Li/Xie 1996: 179; Gongren Ribao, 8 July 97
31 Guanli Shijie, op. cit. Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 November 1997: 28.
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politics. The state should therefore keep them more strictly under control.32 O  the e hand then,
private entrepreneurs are virtually declared to be anti-socialist, but at the same time their potential is
to be used to develop the economy. The political implications of this classification seem to be more
important, namely political control, surveillance, distrust and administrative arbitrariness towards
entrepreneurs, since the party leadership sees them as capitalist and hence regressive, backward-
looking elements. For the declared aim of the Party is still socialism, capitalism is expressly rejected
and the class struggle between socialism and capitalism manifests itself in all areas of society.33
3 The State of Privatization and Entrepreneurship in China and Vietnam
3.1 China
What does private economic activity at present include? Let us first refer to the registered official
private sector, shown in the figures from 1996/97:
- 28.51 million "individual businesses" 34 (g tihu) with 54.42 million workers (1997)
- about 961,000 registered "private enterprises"35 (siren qiye) employing 13.49 million (1997)
- 25.83 million private rural enterprises with a work-force of 72.78 million people (1996)
- 120,000 private scientific-technical enterprises (minying keji shiye) employing 2.91 million
people (1996)
- 220,000 enterprises (joint ventures or run with foreign capital) employing 25.01 million workers
and staff members (1996).36
In 1996/97 there were at least 55.64 million enterprises with a work-force of 168.61 million people
in the private sector. If we add the informal sector, namely unregistered private enterprises, family
member helpers, persons with a second job that yielded the majority of their income, as well as the
great number of enterprises with a state or collective status though in fact being private (especially in
rural areas) and joint stock companies, it is possible that at present there are at least 250 million
people working in the private sector. This figure is equivalent to about 35 % of the work-force,
although it does not include any kind of the mixed forms of ownership, state and collective
enterprises run quasi-privately (krypto-private activities), nor letting and leasing, even though the
letting of public enterprises by contract has to be regarded as a form of priv tization.
The initial starting point for the development of the private sector was poverty in the countryside.
Already in the middle of the 1970s, i.e. several years before the first political reforms, a spontaneous
shadow economy developed, particularly in poor areas. As a consequence many "free" markets
developed which at that time were considered illegal. During the economic crisis in the second half of
the 1970s, the pressure from the countryside grew and some provinces (Anhui, Sichuan) tolerated
                                                
32 Political Report 1996: 115.
33 Trong 1996: 5-11; Tien 1995: 33/34.
34 Enterprises with less than 8 employees.
35 Enterprises with more than 7 employees.
36 Zhongguo Gongshang Bao (China's Industry and Commerce Daily), 25 April 1997, 27 January and 20 March
1998; Renmin Ribao, 10 April 1997 and 10 March 1998.
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this development. The return to family economy led to the revival of the private small individual
business sector in 1979, as in the countryside it eventually led to redundancy for 150-200 million
workers (according to Chinese data) who had no access to urban job markets or to the state sector.
The only place where they could be absorbed back into the workforce was the informal sector i.e.
self-employment. To begin with, it remained forbidden to employ workers as waged labour.
However, as more and more small businesses employed 'family' or 'relatives', waged labour became
standard. Hesitatingly the state allowed first the employment of two, then five and finally seven
workers during the first half of the 1980s. The real state of affairs was, however, always one step
ahead of the decisions made by the state. The development of the private sector was no longer under
control, especially since the advantages it offered in terms of employment, providing consumer goods
and income for local communities were very obvious. In June 1988 the State Council decreed the
"Provisory Regulations for Private Enterprises in the People's Republic of China". The employee
limits were removed and with them the main restriction on the development of the private sector.37
                                                
37 For this development see Heberer 1989. The Private Enterprises Law in: Renmin Ribao, 29 June 1988.
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Figure 3: Deviance becomes Policy: the Case of the Private Sector
Communist Party          Peasantry
60s/70s
1975     Illegal Activities:
Markets, private economic
activities
1976 – 78      Crisis of Legitimacy          preliminary spontaneous
  private tendencies
since 1978           Permittance of          Illegally employed (i.e.):
      Individual Economy 1 – 2 wage-labourers
1981    Employment permitted:         i.e.: 3 – 5 wage-labourers
         1 – 2 labourers
1983    Employment permitted:        i.e.: up to 5 wage-labourers
     3 – 5 wage-labourers
1985    Employment permitted:         i.e.: more than 7 labourers
   Up to 7 wage-labourers
since 1987       No more employment              Rapid delopment
restrictions   of private sector
3.2 Vietnam
Despite considerable collectivisation and nationalisation of the North-Vietnamese economy in the
1950s and 1960s, peasants retained a certain degree of economic autonomy.38 In Hanoi, the capital
of North Vietnam and later of the whole of Vietnam, private companies did business to a limited
extent, mostly in the tertiary sector.39
                                                
38 Porter 1993: 44; Werner 1984: 48.
39 Le Ngoc Hung/Rondinelli 1993: 9.
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In contrast to northern Vietnam, after 1975 a considerable proportion of the South Vietnamese
economy remained outside state control: "At the end of the 1970s collective and privately owned
industry operating outside the plan still accounted for close to 40% of industrial output".40 The
planned and collective economy was obviously not accepted by the South Vietnamese population
which had been educated in the ways of the market economy for years by massive American
influence lasting from the 1950s to the middle of the 1970s. The academic literature even describes
official tolerance of the informal, private sector, for example in trade and small businesses, before
1986, since in this way state companies could be provided with input-goods.41 The econ mic crisis
of 1978 to 1981 led to a great increase in the number of people taking up secondary jobs, for which
state materials and goods were often "put to one side" (e.g. building materials and machines from
state companies were "borrowed" for private jobs).42 In addition to this shadow economy, which at
least in the South was quite extensive, a grey area in the form of lease contracts between state or
collective companies and private households or individuals emerged, which was allowed substantial
economic room to manoeuvre.
Among the most important reform measures introduced since 1986 which supported the further
development of the private economy was a government decree on enterprises (state, collective and
private) in 1988. This decree was the first to create a legal basis for entrepreneurial activities, which
already existed to an extent in the private sector. It also contained three decrees from the Council of
Ministers concerning the collective, household and the private economy. Household economy (or
house or home economy) consisted of all private secondary jobs done by workers, peasants and
civil servants. Private economy on the other hand was defined as any private business activity
considered as a person's main job.43
Parallel to the extension of the private sector through the founding of new companies, the state sector
was restructured leading to a reduction in the number of state companies from around 12,000 to
6,310 by the end of 1995 and down to 5,790 by the middle of 1997. Whilst some of the companies
were closed at local level, the majority simply seem to have been combined into larger companies.
Over a million jobs have been lost through this measure which have to be compensated for by the
private sector.44 Despite this apparently impressive restructuring, the Vietnamese government still
does not have a clear privatisation or reform programme for the state sector. There has been some
very hesitant equitization of some state companies, but until now it has remained unsuccessful.
There has been some 'spontaneous' privatisation in Vietnam. A large number of state companies
have been contractually handed over to the managers with few conditions attached. Those who
managed to make profits without state subsidies were able to become rich very quickly. Additionally,
state assets from these enterprises were often redirected into private companies owned by the
managers or their families.45 For this reason, it is these managers who are resisting the legal
privatisation process suggested by the World Bank, as they would then lose control of the state
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assets which they have acquired for free and therefore would make no more private profits. This is
also the reason why until 1995 only 19 of a total of 6,000 state companies had applied for
privatisation and only three of those have actually gone through with the plan.46
The total of officially registered limited companies, private businesses and joint-stock companies in
the middle of 1995 was 23,960; there were 1.88 mio small or family businesses and 7,179 state
enterprises.47 Ronnas gives different figures (1996 2.2 million household enterprises, 20,000 private
enterprises, 8,300 limited liability companies and 190 joint-stock companies).48 The differences
between these figures show how difficult it is to express the situation in figures, as the different
estimates reflect different political opinions.
As far as determining the quantitative extent of private business activities is concerned there are
similar difficulties in Vietnam to in China. It is not possible to estimate the extent of the shadow
economy, which consists on the one hand of secondary jobs and on the other hand of illegal if not
criminal operations like smuggling and so on. Le Dan Doanh, head of the renowned Institute for
Economic Management (CIEM) in Hanoi, estimates that in 1996 over one million non-registered
private companies were trading in Vietnam.
As in China, false registration is a central problem which is widespread among collectively owned
companies and small businesses alike. Although they should long since have been registered as
private companies because of their size (20, 30 or 50 workers) and capital assets, many
entrepreneurs refuse to re-register because it would, for example, move the company into a higher
tax bracket. Many state and collectively owned companies exist as such only nominally. In reality
they hardly differ from private companies. In some Vietnamese statistics the collectively owned
sector is already classified with the private sector.49
In terms of personnel the two sectors are also very closely interlinked. At least 39% of entrepreneurs
had previously worked as employees or managers in state and collective companies. In this area too
one finds a striking difference between North and South Vietnam. From the 39% mentioned above,
nearly half came from North Vietnam and less than a third from the South. Connections which had
been made whilst previously working in the state or collective sector have been kept up after
founding private companies and contribute in this way to the close links between the different sectors
of the economy in northern Vietnam. The closer links between the state and the private sector in
northern Vietnam reflect the historically different development of the economy in the different parts of
the country with decades of socialist structures in the North. On the other hand, private enterprises
compete with state enterprises.
In both countries, privatisation began as a spontaneous process, initially among peasants in the
countryside. As well as widespread rural poverty before there were any reforms, other factors were
also important: the peasants' strong desire for private property and family-based management forms;
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a certain autonomy the peasants enjoyed vis-à-vis the state; the peasants were not integrated in the
state social welfare system; and the fact that the political leadership tolerated and ideologically
accepted private activities as long as they did not involve employing workers as waged labour and
therefore exploitation. The acceptance of private economy, however, turned out to be a Pandora's
box, because private business activities almost automatically lead to employment of waged labour.
Private business activities by peasants were easier for the political elite to tolerate because the
peasants were not the main actor in the socialist re-modelling of the country, unlike the workers. The
primary aim in both countries was industrialisation and ocializ tion in urban areas, whilst the
agricultural sector - according to prevailing opinion - should have become less and less important as
industrialisation progressed. In all socialist countries it was the cities and the urban economy, and
above all large industrial concerns, which were regarded as the crucial sector for the dominance of
socialist management. Liberalisation and privatisation processes which began in rural areas could
therefore be tolerated more easily because they did not appear to threaten the Communist Party's
real base of power i.e. industry and cities.50
4 Entrepreneurs as a Category in China and Vietnam
The owners of private enterprises in both countries can be divided up into the following groups:
- Small individual businesses (traders and skilled manual workers who run their own business
alone or with support from members of the family)
- Small businesses with a limited number of waged-labour workers
- Large-scale entrepreneurs
- Suppliers of capital or share-holders who are in fact owners but do not work in the enterprise
itself.
Entrepreneurs are not a single, homogenous group. There are entrepreneurs running large, medium-
sized and small businesses, there are entrepreneurs whose origins lie in the local Party or state
bureaucracy (cadres) who have significant connections, and those without such contacts. Werner
Sombart distinguishes between "powerful" and "cunning" entrepreneurs. The "powerful" ones come
from bureaucratic origins and can count on the power potential to which they have access thanks to
their previous jobs (cultural capital, connections, networks). The "cunning" entrepreneurs act more as
"conquerors" and tend to rely on their entrepreneurial trading potential.51 There are 'push'
entrepreneurs, who have become self-employed because they were dissatisfied with the working
conditions in their previous employment, and there are 'pull' entrepreneurs who are attracted to the
business of being an entrepreneur with its social and financial opportunities and have given up their
previous job for this reason.52 One could classify entrepreneurs according to the different reasons for
choosing self-employment, for example a) making use of market opportunities and incentives (mostly
in urban areas and more developed regions); b) blocked prospects of upward mobility; c) privileged
chances (privileges, social connections) for members of the political elite and sub-elite (particularly at
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local level); d) survival strategies (the unemployed, pensioners).53 Fi ally, social strata within the
entrepreneurship should not be overlooked. Another alternative categorisation would be by means of
area of trade or industry, or origin: from a family business, from a political and administration-based
network of connections, or from a business background (business enterprise or business
administration). Each of these groups has its own status which among owners is based on business
success, level of education, social connections and (particularly in rural areas) achievements for the
community (job creation, financial support for public projects, raising the local standard of living).
Private small businesses are run mainly by people for whom the state-collective sector and
agriculture offer no suitable occupation or income. In urban areas these tend to be the unemployed,
pensioners, the disabled and those with a criminal record, in the countryside it often affects peasants.
These are mainly people with little education who come from the lower strata of society. Self-
employment in the informal sector is, as in other developing countries, the only economic alternative.
In recent years increasing numbers of workers have been leaving struggling state-collective
companies which can no longer guarantee their workers a minimum suitable wage or social package.
Some of the smallest businesses are monetarily very strong, but they consume most of their income.
Political uncertainties stop them from investing larger sums. The small group who do re-invest tend to
develop into large businesses.
The large-scale entrepreneurs (in the "private sector") are in a quite different situation to that of
managers of small enterprises. The second Chinese 1% sample of private entrepreneurs in 1995 and
our own investigations showed the following trends for China, which incidentally are very similar to
those in Vietnam:
- two thirds were between 31 and 45 years old;
- 18.4% had been to university or polytechnic (the figure for the entire population according to the
1990 census was 1.9%), only 0.3% were illiterate (for the entire population the figure is around
22%);
- the initial capital was in most cases the person's own income and savings (90.6%) or that of
relatives and friends (70.6%). The majority of the companies were founded by one (56.1%) or
by two or three (28.8%) suppliers of capital;
- 24.2% of the urban and 17.3% of the rural entrepreneurs had been functionaries before
becoming entrepreneurs (the dominant job group);
- 58.6% of the urban and 35.3% of the rural entrepreneurs came from the public sector (state and
collective-owned companies);
- 22.3% of the urban and 11.2% of the rural private entrepreneurs' fathers were functionaries,
23.3% of the urban and 13.3% of the rural spouses were functionaries, 26.0% of the children
(urban; rural 19.2%), 39.1% of close relatives of urban entrepreneurs as compared to 26.4% of
the rural ones and 46.2% (urban) compared to 42.2% (rural) of their friends were cadres;54
- the occupation of the father (whether previously or at present) obviously plays an important role:
research findings have shown that a considerable proportion of entrepreneurs' children also
become self-employed.55
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- The annual income for 60.7% of the entrepreneurs was between 10,000 and 100,000 yuan,
12.7% had more that 100,000 yuan (for comparison: the per capita income in 1995 was 3,893
yuan in urban areas and 1,578 yuan in rural ones).56
- At 17.1% the percentage of party members was above average (for the whole of China it is
around 5%).57
Large-scale rural entrepreneurs in both countries are on the whole former officials, technicians,
qualified workers from various areas, people with relatively high levels of education or experience,
and people with good personal connections with bureaucracy. On the whole this stratum is financially
quite well-off and it has been forced to re-invest in order to survive economically. The number of
employees per company is continually rising as is the number of enterprises, leading to a well-off
entrepreneur stratum.
Unlike in the small, individual business sector, the new industrial entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam
are not from the lower class, but mostly from the local sub-elite (former managers in state-owned
and collective-owned enterprises, rural party functionaries), the immediate surroundings of the local
elite (relatives of cadres), the lower middle stratum (blue collar workers, purchasing agents and sales
representatives in state factories, successful individual entrepreneurs), also partly from political "fringe
groups" who were prevented from participating in social upward mobility (former "class enemies"
and their family members). This contradicts the opinion of western social scientists who had come to
the conclusion that brigands and buccaneers were the "original" entrepreneur-type.58 Th  obs rvation
that in postsocialist societies it was often talented individuals from the lower classes who became rich
during the transition from the planned to the market economy, and who did so by no means entirely
legal means, where fortunes were often amassed by private acquisition of state property,59 is only
partly valid for China. Such people can mostly be found in trade, in small individual businesses and in
the shadow economy. However, the small business and shadow economy sectors should be
regarded as the training ground where ongoing managers of large private enterprises can cut their
teeth. Comparisons between different countries show that during massive changes in the economy,
society and basic values, it is also members of the upper class (including the local upper class) who
become entrepreneurs, firstly because they are in a position to understand the changes taking place
due to their knowledge of social relations and activities. Secondly they wish to maintain their
traditional role despite the changes, and thirdly they are distinctly market oriented anyway.60 In China
and Vietnam, it is functionaries and their relatives who are contributing in this way to social change
and to the economisation of politics.
5 Socio-political Impact of Privatization: Social Change
Socio-political change, or to use a more familiar term, social change does not refer to mere
alterations within the respective economic, political or social sub-system, but means change to the
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social structures of a system, or rather to the whole system itself. Social structures constitute
"regularities", such as role behaviour, values, organisation patterns, social stratification and so on.61
Social change is therefore a highly complex and comprehensive process which it is difficult to cover
in its entirety in empirical analysis. We have therefore concentrated on the following central aspects:
- Social stratification and change in elites, or rather the development of a new elite. Leading
officials (administration, Party) represent the political elite, whereas upwardly mobile private
entrepreneurs can be seen as the new business elite. There is some, limited, exchange of
personnel between the political and the business elite, in particular in the form of cadres joining
the business elite. Additionally, in the course of privatisation processes there is a degree of
overlap between the two elites as some cadres are simultaneously also involved in private
business. As far as the social strata are concerned, there are differences between the pre-reform
period and the reform period. Before the reforms began, the organisation of social strata was
based mainly on political criteria, in that party membership and cadre rank were conditions for
membership of the elite and that those who were considered to be "class enemies", such as
former landlords, rich peasants and their families, were in the lowest social stratum. Increasingly
today, the organisation of strata is more strongly based on economic premises.
- Institutional change. The most visible change is in the personnel, the conception and the
functions of institutions. The existence of the private sector requires institutions too to gear
themselves to the requirements of the market. Cadres have to have the relevant specialist
knowledge to meet these new expectations. Parallel to this development, new institutions and
organisations are emerging, some which represent the interests of private entrepreneurs (interest
associations).
- Change in values and attitudes. Th  private economy requires on the one hand particular
values and attitudes, and on the other hand it changes the attitude to previous values and the
ranking of existing values. All in all a sort of "economisation" of the value system is taking place,
which apparently has already got as far as partly de-ideologising the political ideology.
The rapid and comprehensive economic change which is happening in both countries at the moment
has effects on both society and politics and brings about social change.62 The process of change was
not intended by the political leadership in either country, neither could it simply be kept under
control. The most striking change is the development of a new business elite from below. It consists
mostly of enterpreneurs which have become rich in the course of the privatisation process. Because
of differing market opportunities, a gap in incomes has developed which has led to a polarisation of
society. Recent research findings by Chinese and Vietnamese sociologists reveal drastic differences
in income in both rural and urban areas.
In the early stages of privatisation processes this prosperous group of entrepreneurs is the most
important, but it is by no means the only social actor involved in social change. In the long term this
elite will contribute to institutional change which will eventually also reach the political system, starting
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with the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Entrepreneurs are pushing their way into the bureaucracy in
order to obtain competitive advantages. And their access to the bureaucracy is all the easier, the
more functionaries move into private business for economic reasons.63
This then becomes a necessary condition for the development of a new political elite which can itself
set off a new modernisation drive, as experienced by the NIC-states in East Asia. In these countries
the state or rather the bureaucracy was able to realise its higher aim of modernisation despite
considerable social resistance.64 I  contrast to the business elite, the state has the advantage that
particularistic interests, for example economic ones, can be channelled into a higher aim and if
necessary it can use force to do so. This can only happen if a new business elite exists and if the
conventional type of bureaucracy has undergone change, since a rigid, inflexible political system will
hardly be able to implement change. Some researchers already assume the development of a new
"hybrid" class consisting of cadres from the administration and private entrepreneurs from rural
areas.65
Simultaneously the ability of state and Party to keep control is reduced and at least at the lowest level
their interests are no longer adequately represented. In some provinces in China this process of
change has apparently already progressed so far that in particular in the countryside a dualism of
political and economical power exists.66 Pr vate entrepreneurs are increasingly participating in formal
institutions. According to Chinese research in 1995 14.2% of private entrepreneurs were members
of the People's Congresses and 33.9% were members of the Political Consultative Conferences.67
This development is very worrying for the political leadership. A document from the "United Front
Department" of the CCP's Central Committee required Party committees to keep an eye on private
businesses, because private entrepreneurs were buying votes to get elected in local People's
Congresses or were buying political advocates in Party committees and parliaments.68
On the other hand officials are using their position to enrich themselves by creating advantages for
private enterprises, i. e. via corruption. This form of corruption seems to have become very
widespread during the privatisation process, as is demonstrated by the continual discussions on the
subject in China and Vietnam.69
As a result of the economic privatisation process, new interest groups with strong desires for political
participation have emerged. Entrepreneurs are beginning to organise the representation of their
interests in associations. Economic interests can in this way have a direct political effect, in that they
could lead to a liberalisation of economic policy (prices etc.). In the medium term this can result in
the desire to have a say in politics, which is already partially manifesting itself in the desire of private
entrepreneurs for party membership and a position in the bureaucracy.
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In both countries a significant change in values and attitudes is underway. This is true, for example, of
the attitude to wealth or prosperity. Unlike in the pre-reform period, in which wealth was considered
indicative of exploitation, today prosperity is seen as a desirable and worthwhile aim in life. In China
Deng Xiaoping introduced the slogan that first of all at least part of the population should become
rich. The Chinese mass media are full of reports about individuals' quick-growing 'prosperity'. Luxury
items, new electrical goods, expensive hobbies etc. are accordingly fast becoming the new status
symbols.70
The pursuit of profit has apparently reached such a high level of acceptance that in comparison other
values are losing importance. Sociologists in both countries have observed that in particular the
family, one of the most important, basic social units, is suffering in the course of this change of values.
Many parents hardly spend any of their time bringing up their children because they are too busy
earning money.71 Similarly, more and more school pupils are playing truant in order to make financial
gains.72
However, the social security offered by employment in the state sector still seems to attract people.
This seems to be true for both countries, where the insecurity of the state sector has risen significantly
in recent years due to company closures. For example, in a survey at five universities and
polytechnics in Hanoi 85% of the students still expressed a preference for employment in the state
sector.73
According to Vietnamese Ministry of Labour, the positive opinion of the wealthy is accompanied by
a certain animosity towards the poor who have not managed to profit from the reforms.74
An increased consciousness of oneself as an individual rather than as part of a collective is
particularly noticeable among the generation of those born after 1970. A survey of Chinese school
pupils in 1993 showed that nearly 50% of those asked placed their own individual interests above
those of society, and 60% said that the organisation of their future depended on their own efforts.
The interviewers concluded as a result that there is a tendency to prioritise one's own well-being.75
On the whole the early stages of such a comprehensive, far-reaching process of change lead to
disruptions to the social order and lack of orientation. The old order is corroded and shaken to the
core, but has not yet been replaced by a new, generally accepted order. Both economic and the
subsequent socio-political change therefore first of all leads to destabilisation and furthers the
differentiation and polarisation (social, regional).
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6 Conclusion
Society differentiates itself in the sense of the above-described social change. Privatization from
below, including the establishment of small enterprises, facilitates the process of change and thereby
the "quiet revolution from below". This process does not automatically lead to a breakdown of the
political system but erodes it in its present form.
In this context, the decisive question is whether a middle class will develop out of this new economic
elite that might direct economic and political changes and thus lead the process of democratization.
Barrington Moore`s slogan "no bourgeoisie, no democracy", having apparently been proved by the
developments in Taiwan and South Korea, today also applies to China and Vietnam. There is hope
that in the long run a process of democratization will be generated by market development, private
economy, more autonomy in society with regards to the state, the change of elites, the rise of
independent interest groups and the formation of a "middle class".
The term "middle class" refers to a new middle stratum, that is to groups such as private
entrepreneurs, employees in higher- or medium-level positions, civil servants, a great part of the
intelligentsia as well as to independent professions that are once again to be found in increasing
numbers. In China and Vietnam, the greatest hopes are focused on entrepreneurs, the stratum that is
growing most quickly and is the wealthiest and most influential.
There are a number of reasons for but also against this supposition. A group has in fact come into
existence whose protagonists, larger-scale private entrepreneurs and managers of big firms, pursue
common economic interests and goals. This group has particular ideas regarding social development
as well as an interest in participating in politics, though the policies of restriction and control by the
bureaucracy might remind one of a "blocked middle strata", that is a mobility-oriented group
hindered by structural barriers that are part of the traditional system of power.76 Fro  the pposite
point of view this part of the middle stratum seems to be a heterogeneous group without common
interests.77 Some commentators argue that private entrepreneurs are mostly persons with a low level
of education and little social prestige who are only interested in an "economic democracy", allowing
them to establish and run enterprises, but not in a political democracy.78 As a stratum they are said to
be too weak, compared to the Party leaders, to be able to start political processes of change.79
Actually, the middle stratum consists of heterogeneous groups, such as persons with and without
property, people with independent occupations, employees, party functionaries as well as people not
belonging to the Party, intellectuals and persons with a low level of education. The common features,
however, are that they are mainly people with a higher degree of education, training or occupational
experience, who want to freely develop their activities, who are interested in social advances and
who, because of their work, have developed self-confidence, which allows them to strive for more
participation. That does not mean, however, that this group in each case acts unanimously. On the
basis of an interest-coalition, though, it tends towards common action.
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In my opinion, it is not correct to argue that entrepreneurs in the large-scale private sector in general
have a low educational standard. That applies more to people engaged in the small business sector.
Furthermore private entrepreneurs possess entrepreneurial abilities and experience that also have to
be regarded as a factor of education. This also applies to the managers of non-private enterprises.
The argument that private entrepreneurs were only interested in economic democratization is based
on a static attitude. In view of their occupational activities, the economy should be their main interest.
For stable business activity it is necessary to have equal opportunities (just as in the state-collective
sector), a secure legal position and reliable business conditions. Open political actions, however,
such as being drafted as a candidate in elections, or being opposed to the general political direction,
might negatively influence not only business but might also have adverse personal consequences for
the actors. On the other hand being organized in interest associations, being active in parliaments and
other institutions are clear signs of political activities. Critics of political abstinence often wrongly
compare political activities in both countries with those in democratic societies. As far as the social
prestige of larger-scale private entrepreneurs is concerned, in rural regions it is already quite high and
in urban areas it is increasing.
Counter-arguments are based on a conception of a static class. That is why I prefer to use the term
"middle stratum", not middle class. Entrepreneurship in both countries is still at a very early stage.
The characteristics of traditional middle strata are not yet fixed, such as, for example, being safely
embedded in the social establishment of power, prestige and income. As I have shown,
entrepreneurs develop a great variety of interests and activities that go beyond purely economic
matters. That does not mean, however, that they are the only group to change the political system.
For that a broader coalition of interests is necessary. They contribute, though, to a fundamental
change from below. That is why one should not talk of a blocked middle strata, because the
entrepreneurs contribute to the dissolution of the traditional system and its limitations, and the state as
well as the bureaucracy will be less and less able to block this stratum. However, one should always
keep in mind that private ownership is not sufficient to turn the middle stratum into a strong power. It
is also necessary to establish a legal system that protects and promotes entrepreneurs. Interest
groups are a great help in legally securing this business condition while economic legal security is at
the same time a step towards political legal security.
Though Chinese and Vietnamese entrepreneurs do not have much in common with the European
bourgeoisie at its early stage, one cannot deny that a more comprehensive privatization of economic
activities has led to more motivation (due to economic reforms), mobility and the demand for radical
social change. These circumstances have also had an affect on privatization in other sectors.
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